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Case No. 20090538-SC 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee 
v. 
RICKY ANGILAU, 
Defendant/Appellant 
Case No. 20090538-SC 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This is an interlocutory appeal from the denial of Defendant's motion to dismiss for lack 
of jurisdiction the charges of murder, a first-degree felony; obstruction of justice, a second-
degree felony; carrying a concealed dangerous weapon, a second-degree felony; and 
possession of a firearm on school premises, a class A misdemeanor. This Court has 
jurisdiction under UTAH CODE ANN. § 78A-3-102(3)(h) (West Supp. 2009). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
1. Does Utah's direct-file statute, Utah Code Ann. § 78A-6-701(l)(a), mandating 
the prosecution of older, violent juvenile offenders in adult court, violate the state 
uniform operation of law clause? 
2. Does the direct-file statute violate state due process? 
3. Does the direct-file statute violate the state constitutional provision prohibiting 
the enactment of special laws? 
4. Does the direct-file statute violate federal due process? 
5. Does the direct-file statute involve any fundamental or specially protected 
interest warranting a heightened level of scrutiny? 
6. Assuming the constitutional validity of the direct-file statute, did the trial court 
err in holding that it does not fatally conflict with other parts of the Juvenile Courts 
Act, so as to render it inoperable? 
Standards of Review. Issues one through five all attack the constitutionality of the 
direct-file statute. Whether a statute is constitutional presents a question of law, reviewed 
for correctness. No deference is given to the determination of the trial court. See State v. 
Holm, 2006 UT 31, If 10, 137 P.3d 726; State v. Mohi, 901 P.2d 991, 995 (Utah 1995). 
Nonetheless, statutes carry a strong presumption of constitutionality, with doubts resolved 
in favor of the statute. See Mohi, 901 P.2d at 955. 
Issue six involves a matter of statutory interpretation, also reviewed for correctness, with 
no deference granted to the district court's legal conclusions. See State v. Jeffries, 2009 UT 
57, If 4, 217 P.3d 265; State v. Gallegos, 2007 UT 81, \ 8, 171 P.3d 426. 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 
The full text of the following determinative federal and state constitutional provisions 
is reproduced in Addendum A: 
Utah Const, art. I, § 7; Utah Const, art. VI, § 26; 
Utah Const, art. I, § 24; U.S. Const, amend. XIV. 
The following relevant Utah statutory provisions are reproduced in Addendum B: 
Utah Code Ann. § 78A-6-103 (West Supp. 2009); 
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Utah Code Ann. § 78A-6-701 (West Supp. 2009); 
Utah Code Ann. § 78A-6-702 (West Supp. 2009); 
Utah Code Ann. § 78A-6-703 (West Supp. 2009). 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
In January 2009, Defendant—a sixteen-year-old juvenile—and another juvenile boy, 
E.F., exchanged words in the hallway at Kearns High School and agreed to meet off school 
property later that day to fight. R3. Later, as he walked toward the agreed-upon site, 
Defendant showed one of his friends a gun in his waistband, under his shirt. Id. 
As the two boys fought, a group of students surrounded them. Id. During the fight, 
Defendant tired, pulled the gun from his waistband, and fired a single shot into the air. Id. 
He then lowered the gun, pointed it at a group of people, and fired another shot. Id. The 
bullet struck on-looker Esteban Manuel Saidi in the lower abdomen, and Saidi fell to the 
ground. Id. 
Defendant fled, throwing his gun over the fence of one of the houses he passed as he 
headed for a friend's house. Id. at 3-4. Saidi was taken to the Intermountain Medical Center 
where he was pronounced dead. Id. at 3. An autopsy established that the cause of death was 
a gunshot wound. Id. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Procedure. 
On January 26,2009, the State charged Defendant in district court under the direct-file 
statute, Utah Code Ann. § 78A-6-701(l)(a) (West Supp. 2009), with murder, obstruction of 
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justice, carrying a concealed dangerous weapon, and possession of a firearm on school 
premises. Rl-4. The court found Defendant to be indigent and appointed counsel. R6-7. 
Before the preliminary hearing, Defendant moved to dismiss the information for lack of 
jurisdiction. R28-56. Among other things, he argued that the direct-file statute violated both 
state and federal due process and equal protection clauses and that all juveniles have a 
constitutional right to be treated as juveniles. R32-56. In his reply brief, he argued not only 
that the prosecutor should pursue his case in the juvenile courts, but that under a plain 
language interpretation of Utah Code Ann. § 78A-6-116(3) (West Supp. 2009), he must 
proceed in juvenile court. R80-102. That statute, he argued, listed the exceptions to juvenile 
court jurisdiction, and the absence of the direct-file statute from that list required that his case 
be pursued in the juvenile courts. R100-02. 
Challenged Ruling. 
Judge Vernice Trease denied Defendant's motion to dismiss on June 15,2009. R439-45 
(attached in Addendum C). First, she rejected his argument that a plain reading of section 
78A-6-116(3) and section 78A-6-701 revealed a conflict between the two that rendered the 
direct-file statute invalid. See Add. C at 1-4. The judge recognized that Defendant's 
interpretation of those statutes "would effectively render the direct-file statute inoperable." 
Id. at 2. She also recognized her duty to review the statutes '"together, in light of established 
rules of statutory construction, with a view to reconciling any apparent conflict and giving 
each of them effect according to their purpose insofar as that can be accomplished.'" Id. 
(quoting United States Smelting, Ref. & Mining Co. v. Nielsen, 437 P.2d 199, 201 (Utah 
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1968) (Crockett, C J., concurring)). To that end, she looked at the legislative history of the 
statutes and determined that the wording was "a conscious choice" on the legislature's part, 
suggesting that the legislature did not see the provisions to be in conflict. See id. at 2-3. She 
then determined that the amendment and re-numbering of the statutes demonstrated the 
legislature's belief that "it was no longer necessary to include the direct-file language" within 
the predecessor statute to 78A-6-116. See id. at 4. 
Looking at the separate statutes as they presently exist, Judge Trease articulated an 
interpretation that rendered the statutes "consistent without undermining the purposes for 
which they were enacted." Id. She determined that section 78A-6-116 could reasonably be 
viewed as applying to "proceedings originating in the juvenile court" while section 78A-6-
701 plainly did not address cases over which the juvenile court had original jurisdiction. Id. 
This reading, Judge Trease explained, "reconcile[d] any apparent conflict" between the 
statutes. Id. 
Judge Trease then rejected Defendant's claim that the present version of the direct-file 
statute "permits constitutionally excessive prosecutorial discretion" in the filing of murder 
charges against sixteen-and seventeen-year-olds. Id. at 5-6. The judge found that the direct-
file statute mandated that a sixteen- or seventeen-year-old charged with what would be 
murder if committed by an adult "be brought directly to the district court." Id. at 5. 
Consequently, the only discretion remaining was the "legitimate choice of which charge or 
charges to file based upon a consideration of the evidence." Id. Such a 
determination—involving a review of "which elements of an offense can likely be proved 
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at trial"—is precisely the sort of "'charging decision that is protected by traditional notions 
of prosecutor discretion^]'" is "no different" than the "traditional exercise of discretion in 
any criminal case and is not, therefore, constitutionally impermissible." Id. at 5-6 (quoting 
State v. Mohi, 901 P.2d 991, 1003 (Utah), reh'g. denied (Sept. 14, 1995)). 
Finally, Judge Trease summarily rejected Defendant's multiple constitutional challenges 
relating to due process, equal protection, unnecessary rigor, and policy considerations. See 
id. at 6. Relying on this Court's decision in Mohi, Judge Trease held that each of the 
"arguments fail for the simple reason that . . . '[j]uveniles have no constitutional right to be 
tried as juveniles.'" Id. (quoting Mohi, 901 P.2d at 1005) (additional citation omitted). 
Where Defendant had no constitutional "right" to treatment as a juvenile, the judge held, he 
cannot complain that the right was "'unconstitutionally removed by the legislature.'" Id. 
(quoting Mohi, 901 P.2d at 1005). 
This Court granted Defendant's timely petition seeking interlocutory review of the ruling 
on October 14, 2009. See Appellate Docket 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
POINT I. Defendant's first point highlights the benefits of the juvenile system and its 
importance in addressing the needs of juvenile offenders. It does not recognize the 
legislature's emphasis in recent years on the need to address the very real problem of violent 
juvenile crime. That policy is demonstrated by the legislature's stated policy and by its 
implementation of Utah's interrelated statutory scheme for prosecuting young offenders—of 
which the direct-file statute is a part. 
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POINT II. Defendant asks this Court to overrule precedent that holds that there is no 
liberty interest in the initial choice of a forum for prosecuting a juvenile offender. However, 
the cases he relies on in support of his request involve the transfer of juveniles from juvenile 
court to adult court, not the direct filing in an adult court at issue here. Further, his cited 
authority supports the challenged precedent in recognizing that no liberty interest exists. 
POINT HI. Defendant seeks to persuade this Court to recognize that juvenile offenders 
possess a state constitutional right to be prosecuted in juvenile court. There is neither a 
precedential nor a historical basis for his position. In addition, his repeated assertion that 
such a right would be in keeping with or would not offend the various constitutional 
provisions does not establish that such a right is contained within those provisions. 
POINT IV. Defendant challenges the constitutionality of the direct-file statute under the 
state constitution, arguing that the statute violates the uniform operation of laws, due process, 
and prohibition against special laws provisions. He also argues that the statute violates the 
Federal Equal Protection Clause. He argues that the statute provides disparate treatment to 
similarly-situated children because: (1) it may result in the adult prosecution of juveniles 
whose developmental level is similar to younger juveniles who are prosecuted in juvenile 
court; and (2) it provides unfettered prosecutorial discretion in choosing a forum because it 
does not prevent the prosecutor from over- or under-charging a juvenile and because it 
provides no judicial review of the charging decision to ensure uniformity. In addition, he 
argues that the issue requires heightened scrutiny because it impinges on the life, liberty, and 
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education of juveniles. Because no such rights are at issue in the direct-file statute, 
heightened scrutiny is inappropriate. 
Defendant's claims of various constitutional violations lack merit because the direct-file 
statute uniformly applies to the statutory classifications and the means used by the statute are 
rationally related to a proper legislative purpose. The statute uses both age and offense to 
define a specific class of the oldest, most violent juvenile offenders and permits prosecutors 
only that charging discretion protected as traditional prosecutor discretion. The statute then 
mandates adult prosecution for all juveniles falling within the statutory classification. 
Moreover, the direct-file statute's focus on mandating adult prosecution of only the oldest 
and most violent offenders is rationally related to the purpose of promoting public safety and 
individual accountability in the wake of increasing violent juvenile crime. 
POINT V. Defendant challenges the trial court's rejection of his claim that a conflict 
exists between the direct-file statute and another statute dealing with juvenile court 
jurisdiction. He argues that because the latter statute includes a list of exclusions to juvenile 
court jurisdiction that does not include the direct-file statute, his case must be adjudicated by 
the juvenile court. His claim is without merit primarily because the direct-file statute grants 
the district court "exclusive original jurisdiction" over specific matters, rendering it 
unnecessary to exclude those matters from statutes dealing with juvenile court jurisdiction. 
Moreover, his interpretation would render the direct-file statute inoperable, in violation of 
this Court's duty to analyze an act in its entirety and to harmonize any apparent conflict with 
the legislative purpose. 
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ARGUMENTS 
Introduction: 
Overview of Prosecution of Juvenile Felons as Adults. An understanding both of 
Defendant's challenge to the direct file statute and of the purposes behind Utah's treatment 
of juvenile offenders requires a brief look at the statute in context. 
Utah law confers "exclusive original jurisdiction" over juveniles under the age of 
eighteen to the juvenile court system "[ejxcept as otherwise provided by law." Utah Code 
Ann. § 78A-6-103 (West Supp. 2009). One such exception to the juvenile court's exclusive 
jurisdiction appears in Part 7 of the Juvenile Court Act: 
(1) The district court shall have exclusive original jurisdiction over all persons 16 
years of age or older charged by information or indictment with 
(a) an offense which would be murder or aggravated murder if committed 
by an adult; or 
(b) an offense which would be a felony if committed by an adult if the 
minor has been previously committed to a secure facility as defined in 
Section 62 A-7-101.. . . 
Utah Code Ann. § 78A-6-701(l)(a) (emphasis added).1 Thus, under Utah law, the juvenile 
court has no jurisdiction over sixteen- or seventeen-year-olds charged with murder or 
aggravated murder. Instead, "exclusive original jurisdiction" over such juvenile offenders 
lies with the district court. See id. 
because subsection (l)(b) is not at issue in this case, the State discusses only 
subsection (l)(a) herein. However, the State believes that the analysis does not change 
when applied to subsection (l)(b). 
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The legislature has provided three ways for juveniles to face prosecution in an adult 
court. First, under Utah's certification statute, fourteen- and fifteen-year-olds charged with 
felonies may be "certified" by a juvenile court judge for trial in adult court at the request of 
the prosecution, but only after a special hearing. See Utah Code Ann. § 78A-6-703 (West 
Supp. 2009). Under that provision, the matter is commenced in juvenile court; certification 
is proper only after the prosecution establishes probable cause and proves that it is "contrary 
to the best interests of the minor or of the public for the juvenile court to retain jurisdiction." 
Id In making the certification determination, the juvenile court must consider a number of 
factors, similar to those constitutionally approved by the United States Supreme Court in 
Kentv. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 566-67, 86 S. Ct. 1045 (1966). Among these factors is 
the likelihood of rehabilitation in the juvenile court system. See Utah Code Ann. § 78A-6-
703(3)(g). 
Second, under the serious youth offender statute [S YO], sixteen- and seventeen-year-old 
juveniles charged with any of nine specifically enumerated violent felonies or with 
committing dangerous weapon felonies and who have been previously adjudicated or 
convicted for such offenses by a juvenile court may be bound over for trial in adult court. 
See Utah Code Ann. § 78A-6-702(l) (West Supp. 2009). Under the SYO, the prosecution 
must file a criminal information in the juvenile court. In a preliminary hearing held in 
juvenile court, the prosecution must show probable cause to believe that the offense was 
committed and that the juvenile committed it. See id. at § 78A-6-702(3)(a). Upon such 
proof, the juvenile is presumptively bound over unless he can prove the existence of three 
-10-
statutory retention factors by clear and convincing evidence. See id. at § 78A-6-702(3)(b). 
None of those factors includes the juvenile's amenability to rehabilitation or the juvenile's 
prior record. Instead, they address the circumstances surrounding the charged offense. See 
id. Moreover, there is a strong presumption of district court jurisdiction. See id. 
The third say for a juvenile to be tried in adult court is under the direct-file statute at 
issue in this case: 
§ 78A-6-701. Jurisdiction of district court. 
(1) The district court shall have exclusive original jurisdiction over all persons 
16 years of age or older charged by information or indictment with; 
(a) an offense which would be murder or aggravated murder if committed 
by an adul t . . . . 
Utah Code Ann. § 78A-6-701(l) (West Supp. 2009).2 Unlike the certification and SYO 
statutes, the direct-file statute bypasses the juvenile court and grants the district court 
'exclusive original jurisdiction' over juveniles qualified by both age and conduct. See id.; 
see also In re A.B., 936?.2d 1091,1094 (Utah App. 1997). Under the direct file statute, the 
prosecution commences with the mandatory filing of an information in the district court. As 
with the SYO, the juvenile's amenability to rehabilitation is not an issue under this statute. 
See In re A.B., 936 P.2d at 1094. 
2This statute is the "new and more comprehensive approach to the problem of 
violent youth crime" enacted shortly before issuance of the decision in Mohi and 
referenced in Chief Justice Zimmerman's concurring opinion in that case. See Mohi, 901 
P.2d at 1007 (Zimmerman, C J., concurring). 
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Defendant's Arguments. Defendant begins his appeal with arguments aimed at 
persuading this Court to recognize that all juveniles possess a constitutional right to be 
adjudicated in the juvenile system and to overrule precedent to the contrary. See Br. of Aplt. 
at 6-23. He focuses on the developmental differences between adults and juveniles and 
stresses the need to consider rehabilitation and family as integral parts of treating juvenile 
crime. See id. at 6-10. He also argues that the choice of forum for prosecuting juveniles 
involves life, liberty, and educational interests deserving of constitutional protection. See id. 
at 11 -14,20,36. That protection, he argues, is not provided by the direct-file statute, which 
permits the placement of juveniles into adult court at the whim of the prosecutor without due 
process, legislative guidance, or judicial review. See id. 
Defendant then contends that the direct-file statute violates the due process, uniform 
operation of laws, and prohibition of special laws provisions of the Utah Constitution, as well 
as the equal protection guarantee of the federal constitution. See id. at 24-38. Finally, he 
argues that the trial court's rejection of his challenges was based on incorrect legal analysis 
and exceeded proper judicial bounds. See id. at 38-47. The State addresses Defendant's 
arguments in the order in which he presents them in his brief. 
POINT I 
THE LEGISLATIVE POLICY RELATIVE TO VIOLENT JUVENILE 
OFFENDERS NO LONGER FOCUSES ON REHABILITATION 
Defendant sets the stage for his first argument by focusing on the reasons for having a 
juvenile system and highlighting the system's ability to serve the developmental needs of 
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juveniles, to pursue rehabilitation, and to strengthen the family. See Br. of Aplt. at 6-10. 
He fails to recognize, however, that Utah's interrelated statutory scheme for prosecuting 
young offenders represents a "clear" change in legislative policy toward juveniles which is 
meant "to address the increase in 'violent' juvenile crime." In reA.B., 936 P.2d at 1098; see 
State v. Mohi, 901 P.2d 991, 1007 (Utah 1995) (Zimmerman, C J , concurring) ("[T]he 
problems of violent youth crime . . . are real."). The direct-file statute is part of that 
interrelated scheme and deals with the oldest and most violent juvenile offenders. See Utah 
Code Ann. § 78A-6-701(l). 
The legislature also demonstrated its intent to make a "clear" change toward treatment 
of juvenile offenders when it rewrote the statement of purposes for the Juvenile Court Act 
to emphasize public safety, individual accountability, and appropriate sanctions for improper 
behavior before mentioning rehabilitation, reeducation, and treatment for juveniles. 
See Utah Code Ann. § 78A-6-102(5) (West Supp. 2009). The legislature reinforced that 
policy decision in both the SYO and the direct-file statutes, neither of which permits 
consideration of a juvenile's rehabilitative prospects. See In re A.B., 936 P.2d at 1098-99. 
It is this shift in policy away from rehabilitation and toward public safety and appropriate 
sanctions that the direct-file statute serves. 
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POINT II 
DEFENDANT ESTABLISHES NO BASIS UPON WHICH TO OVERRULE 
PRECEDENT ESTABLISHING THAT JUVENILES HAVE NO LIBERTY 
INTEREST IN THE INITIAL CHOICE OF FORUM 
Before arguing the constitutionality of the direct-file statute, Defendant asks this Court 
"to reconsider and overrule" precedent holding that a juvenile offender has no liberty interest 
in the initial choice of forum for his prosecution and no constitutional right to treatment as 
a juvenile. Br. of Aplt. at 10-14.3 He contends that the precedent is no longer valid in light 
of what he deems to be more "[cjarefuliy considered opinions[,]" which require the use of 
procedural protections before making a decision to prosecute a juvenile in adult court. Id. 
at 12. He argues that the more serious sentencing options facing a juvenile in adult court 
and the dangers which accompany imprisonment of juveniles with adults give rise to an 
interest in both liberty and life which requires constitutional protection. See id. at 11-14. 
A defendant seeking to have precedent overruled carries a heavy burden. See Hoyer v. 
State, 2009 UT 38, \ 26, 212 P.3d 547 (requiring proof that the precedent was "clearly 
erroneous or conditions have changed so as to render the prior decision inapplicable."') 
(quoting State v. Menzies, 889 P.2d 393, 399 n.3 (Utah 1994) (internal quotation marks 
omitted)). Defendant fails to carry that burden. 
The "considered opinions*' relied on by Defendant do not support his arguments for two 
reasons. First, those cases do not address the direct filing of a case against a juvenile in 
defendant seeks to have this Court overrule State v. D.M.Z., 830 P.2d 314 (Utah 
App. 1992); Burnham v. Hayward, 663 P.2d 65 (Utah 1983); and State v. Atcheson, 575 
P.2d 181 (Utah 1978). SeeBi. of Aplt. at 11-14. 
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district court. Instead, the "considered opinions" recognize a need for "appropriate 
procedural protections" when a decision is to be made concerning the transfer of a case from 
juvenile to adult court. Br. of Aplt. at 12 (citing State in re Clatterbuck, 700 P.2d 1076, 
1078 (Utah 1985); Mohi, 901 P.2d at 995-96; and In re N.H.B., 111 P.2d 487, 490 (Utah 
App. 1989)). That need arose from the United States Supreme Court's opinion in Kent, 3 83 
U.S. 541. See Mohi, 901 P.2d 995-96 & n.2 (citing to Clatterbuck and Kent and 
acknowledging that Clatterbuck is based on Kent); Clatterbuck, 700 P.2d at 1079 (quoting 
Kent, 383 U.S. at 553); N.H.B., 11 P.2d at 490 (citing Kent, 383 U.S. at 553). 
Kent provides that the transfer of a juvenile to the adult system is a "critically important 
question" because it "determines] vitally important statutory rights of the juvenile." Kent, 
383 U.S. at 556. It is the invocation of the juvenile court's original and exclusive 
jurisdiction over the juvenile that triggers application of the various statutory rights and 
immunities of the legislatively-created juvenile system. See id. at 556-57. The subsequent 
transfer determination necessarily affects the juvenile's statutory rights, thus entitling the 
juvenile to "appropriate procedural protections^]" Id. Nothing in Kent, however, establishes 
any constitutional basis for those procedural protections. 
Where, as here, the case against the juvenile is not commenced in the juvenile court but 
is directly filed in adult court under a statute that grants the adult court "exclusive original 
jurisdiction" over the juvenile, none of the statutory rights relative to the juvenile system 
arises to trigger the need for "appropriate . . . protections." Indeed, this Court recognized 
this in Mohi: when the legislature "uniformly decides to remove a certain class of persons 
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from the category of 'juvenile offender/ it does not need to allow those persons a hearing 
on the matter" because with "no 'right' to juvenile treatment, defendants cannot claim that 
their juvenile status was unconstitutionally removed" by the prosecution under the direct-file 
statute. 901 P.3d at 1005. In other words, any statutorily-created liberty interest a juvenile 
offender may have in remaining in juvenile court is not implicated under the direct-file 
statute because he has no right to be in the juvenile court system in the first place. Instead, 
he acquires all the constitutional rights attendant to criminal prosecution in the adult system. 
Second, the challenged precedent and the "considered opinions" treat both the transfer 
and the liberty interest issues uniformly. They both broadly recognize the critical importance 
of the transfer decision. See Mohi, 901 P.2d at 995-96 & n.2; State v. D.M.Z., 830 P.2d 314 
(Utah App. 1992) ("'Because the issue of whether a juvenile should be transferred to the 
adult system is critically important, the juvenile must be afforded appropriate protections.'") 
(quoting Kent, 383 U.S. at 553, and Clatterbuck, 700 P.2d at 1079) (addressing a 
certification proceeding): In re N.H.B., 777 P.2d at 490; see also State in re R.D.S., 777 P.2d 
532, 534-35 (Utah App.1989) (recall hearing), cert, granted, 789 P.2d 33 (Utah 1990). 
They also uniformly reject the assertion of a liberty interest. See Mohi, 901 P.2d at 995-96 
(rejecting Mohi's claim of a liberty interest under the direct-file statute); D.M.Z., 830 P.2d 
at 316 (while a juvenile defendant in a certification hearing is entitled to "appropriate 
[procedural] protections," the hearing is simply "to select a forum, not to inquire into 
culpability. Thus no liberty interests are implicated.") (citing R.D.S., 111 P.2d at 535, and 
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InreN.KB., 777 ?2d 3t 490); In re Atcheson, 575P.2d 181,184 (Utah 1978). "[B]ecause 
a deprivation of liberty occurs only upon the defendant's conviction of a crime for which he 
is criminally responsible, and since there is no constitutional right to youthful offender 
treatment, a defendant cannot assert a valid claim of denial of liberty if he or she is charged 
and sentenced as an adult in accordance with the law." Bell, 785 P.2d at 399. Accord 
D.M.Z., 830 P.2d at 316 (no liberty interest involved in certification hearing). 
Because the precedent challenged by Defendant is in accord with his "considered 
opinions," there is no basis on which to overrule the precedent. See Hoyer, 2009 UT 38, 
1126. 
POINT III 
DEFENDANT ESTABLISHES NO STATE CONSTITUTIONAL 
RIGHT TO TREATMENT AS A JUVENILE 
Contrary to well-established precedent, see Point II, supra, Defendant asks this Court 
"to recognize that all children do have a state constitutional right to be prosecuted in juvenile 
court[.]" Br. of Aplt. at 20. Before identifying the possible constitutional provisions he 
believes would support such a ruling, Defendant argues that the direct-file statute is 
unconstitutional under Mohi because it gives unfettered discretion to the prosecutor in the 
initial choice of a forum and because it lacks review mechanisms. See id. at 14-19. He then 
claims significance in the fact that this Court tempered its allegedly non-binding approval 
of direct-filing violent juveniles in adult court without a hearing with a footnote citing a 
Tenth Circuit case requiring a Kent hearing before transferring a child from juvenile to adult 
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court.4 See id. at 19-20. Only then does Defendant articulate any bases for his claim to a 
state constitutional right to be prosecuted in the juvenile court. See id. at 20-23. But just 
as Defendant cannot show a federal constitutional right to be prosecuted in juvenile court 
(see Kent discussion, supra), he has not shown any basis for a state constitutional right to 
be prosecuted in the juvenile court. 
To the extent Defendant argues that the absence of constitutional protections justifies 
creation of a constitutional right where none previously existed, his argument lacks merit or 
authority. The absence of due process or prosecutorial oversight does not automatically give 
rise to a constitutional right to juvenile treatment.5 See, e.g., Mohi, 901 P.2d at 1002-03, 
1005 (although the direct-file statute was deemed unconstitutional due to lack of legislative 
guidance in the filing of charges, this Court recognized there remained no constitutional 
right to juvenile treatment). 
4See Point II, supra. This Court's caution of a possible federal constitutional 
question arising should the legislature attempt to try all juveniles as adults without 
judicial review is irrelevant to the validity under the state constitution of the direct-file 
statute. 
Additionally, what Defendant views as non-binding "dictum" in Mohi is, in fact, a 
re-statement of part of the majority opinion. See Br. of Aplt. at 19 (emphasis omitted). 
The statement he references provides: "As part II of this opinion states, the state is not 
required to give juvenile status to anyone." Mohi, 901 P.2d at 1005 (emphasis added). 
defendant's arguments concerning "unbridled" prosecutorial discretion, lack of 
judicial review, and unconstitutionality of the direct-file statute are presented in his 
subsequent arguments. See Br. of Aplt. at 24-35. As they are not relevant to establishing 
the existence of a state constitutional right to treatment as a juvenile, the State does not 
address them at this time but includes them hereafter. See infra, Point IV. 
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Further, Defendant establishes no basis for reading such a right into the various state 
constitutional provisions he identifies. See id. at 20-23.6 He simply contends that the right 
"flows naturally from and should be grounded in" various state provisions. See id. at 20. 
He points first to the due process provision of Article I, section 7 of the Utah 
Constitution, claiming both life and liberty interests are at stake in the forum choice. See id. 
As argued in Point II, supra, Defendant fails to establish that either right exists. His interests 
are simply those which derive from his criminal prosecution in adult court, and they are 
accompanied by the full panoply of constitutional protections that accompany such a 
prosecution. 
He also suggests that the uniform operation of laws provision in Article I section 24 
supports a constitutional right to juvenile treatment because of its emphasis on equal 
treatment for all similarly situated children and prohibition on classifications that do not 
further statutory goals. See id. He merely points out that recognition of a right to juvenile 
prosecution would meet all the statutory purposes behind the Juvenile Court Act by 
establishing a single class of juveniles whose treatment would differ only after proper review 
that established the need for a transfer to adult court. See id. at 20-21. 
Similarly, he offers Article VI, § 26, which forbids enactment of laws that create 
"unnatural" classifications among people who are not legitimately separated from the larger 
6Defendant also mentions the federal due process and equal protection clauses, but 
does not elaborate except to say that they are "discussed further herein." Br. of Aplt. at 
20. He makes no separate federal due process argument but references the decision in 
Kent, which the State has addressed supra at Point I. See Br. of Aplt. at 20. The State 
addresses the federal equal protection argument in Point IV, infra. 
-19-
group of which they are a natural part. See id. at 21; Utah Const., Art. I, § 26. He states that 
defining the "natural group" of juveniles in terms of their universally underdeveloped brains 
"honors the letter and spirit" of Article VI, § 26. Br. of Aplt. at 21. 
Defendant's arguments demonstrate an effort to require the legislature to legislate 
identically against all juveniles as a single group in order to account for their developmental 
differences without providing any authority for such a broad restriction. He cites nothing 
to support the implication that the universe of juveniles cannot be naturally and legitimately 
divided into various classifications. 
Neither has such a restriction proved to be warranted. It is the legislature that 
determines the relevant classifications pertaining to the legislatively-created juvenile court 
system. SeeA.B., 936 P.2d at 1098-99; Mohi, 901 P.2d at 1002-03,1005; Salt Lake County 
v. Salt Lake City, 42 Utah 548,134 P. 560 (1913). Article I section 24 simply requires that 
the classifications made by the legislature allow the law to be applied uniformly, not that the 
law be applied to anyone in particular. See Mohi, 901 P.2d at 1003, 1005 (the legislature 
has the ability to provide that "all members of a certain group of violent juveniles" may be 
tried as adults if it does so within the constraints of the uniform operation of laws). If the 
legislature chooses to apply the juvenile system to all juveniles as a single classification, it 
is free to do so, but Article 1 section 24 does not require that it do so. See Mohi, 901 P.2d 
at 1003, 1005. Nothing in Defendant's argument establishes otherwise. 
Moreover, the legislature has made clear that it does not intend that juveniles be treated 
as a single classification but has changed its policy toward juveniles by providing for 
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multiple classifications in order to better address various aspects of juvenile crime, including 
the increase in "violent" juvenile crime and the need to protect society while addressing the 
needs of the juveniles. In reAB., 936 P.2d at 1098; MohU 901 P.2d at 1007 (Zimmerman, 
C.J., concurring) (noting the "real" problems of violent youth crime); see also Utah Code 
Ann. § 78A-6-102(5) (noting that the juvenile system's first purpose is to promote "public 
safety and individual accountability by the imposition of appropriate sanctions" on 
offenders). See also Introduction, supra. The legislature's policy determinations are to be 
respected. See Zamora v. Draper, 635 P.2d 78, 80 (Utah 1981) (cited in In reAB., 936 P.2d 
at 1098) ("the prerogative of the legislature as the creators of the law is to be respected."). 
Defendant also advances Article I, § 9, the necessary rigor clause, as a basis for a 
constitutional right to juvenile treatment because it is designed to protect the accused from 
inhumane detention. See Br. of Aplt. at 21. The unnecessary rigor clause applies here, he 
claims, because of the risk that juveniles who have been charged under to the direct-file 
statute will be placed in adult jails. See id. at 21-22. To the extent such confinement 
involves any risk to the violent juvenile offenders charged directly in adult court, Defendant 
fails to show that the concern may not be folly addressed by the constitutional rights which 
exist in the adult criminal arena. No new state constitutional right in the juvenile system is 
necessary to safeguard these offenders. 
Finally, Defendant cites Article I, § 27, the fundamental rights clause, arguing that a 
constitutional right to treatment as a juvenile furthers the State's civilized treatment of its 
juvenile offenders and its interest in protecting children and strengthening families. See Br. 
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of Aplt. at 22-23. His argument ignores the myriad of other purposes behind the juvenile 
system and implies, without establishing, that any other treatment of juveniles is less than 
civilized. In any event, that section is no less well met by the State's interest in protecting 
society from violent juvenile offenders. This section has been well-served by the 
legislature's creation of a system that strives to balance both the interests of the public with 
those of juvenile offenders, both violent and otherwise. It does not warrant imposition of 
a constitutional right to a legislatively-created juvenile system. 
The problem inherent in nearly all of Defendant's summary arguments is that he fails 
to provide any authority for the proposition that a constitutional right should be recognized 
simply because to do so is in keeping with or will not offend the constitution. 
The juvenile system is a statutory creature, giving the legislature the prerogative to 
determine its scope and application within constitutional parameters. See A.B., 936 P.2d at 
1098-99; Afo/w, 901 P.2d at 1002-03, \005;SaltLake County v. SaltLake City, 42 Utah 548, 
134 P. 560 (1913) (juvenile courts were established pursuant to the authority vested in the 
legislature by the state constitution). No constitutional right to juvenile treatment existed 
historically, and Defendant identifies no basis for labeling any such right as inherent. See, 
e.g., Lynn D. Wardle, Introduction to Utah Juvenile Court Guidebook iv (Lynn Wardle et 
al. eds., 2004) ("The historical antecedent for juvenile court jurisdiction in cases of 
delinquency was the general criminal jurisdiction of the law courts.5'); In re Gault, 387 U.S. 
1,16 (1967) (noting that at common law, children were subject to arrest, trial, and, in theory, 
punishment like adult offenders). 
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Utah's courts have repeatedly rejected the idea that a constitutional right to juvenile 
treatment exists. See Bell, 785 P.2d at 399 ("A juvenile has no right to treatment in the 
juvenile system or to be specially treated as a juvenile delinquent instead of a criminal 
offender.") (internal quotations omitted); see also Mohi, 901 P.2d at 1002-3,1005 ("[T]he 
state is not required to give juvenile status to anyone."); D.M.Z., 830 P.2d at 316; N.H.B., 
111 P.2d at 490. Instead, this Court has recognized that the State may choose to treat some 
or all juvenile defendants as criminal offenders subjected to the original and exclusive 
jurisdiction of the district courts with the constitutional protections and guarantees provided 
in that venue. See, e.g., Mohi, 901 P.2d at 1002-03, 1005. Defendant's argument that the 
granting of a constitutional right to juvenile treatment does not offend various parts of the 
state constitution falls short of establishing a basis upon which to read such a right into the 
state constitution. 
POINT IV 
UTAH'S DIRECT-FILE STATUTE IS NOT UNCONSTITUTIONAL 
UNDER STATE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 
A. Uniform Operation of Laws & Due Process 
Defendant argues that the direct-file statute violates the uniform operation of laws 
provision (article I, section 24) and the due process provision (article I, section 7) of the state 
constitution. See Br. of Aplt. at 24-35. Both provisions seek to "ensure that legislation is 
' rationally related to the accomplishment of some legitimate state purposef.]'" Tindley v. Salt 
Lake City School District, 2005 UT 30, |27,116 P.3d 295 (quoting Utah Safe to Learn-Safe 
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to Worship Coalition, Inc. v. State, 2004 UT 32, ^ 31, 94 P.3d 217). Consequently, the 
analysis of Defendant's arguments relative to these provisions will overlap considerably.7 
See id. (quotations omitted). 
Legislative enactments are endowed with a strong presumption of validity and will not 
be declared unconstitutional unless there is no reasonable basis upon which they can be 
construed as conforming to constitutional requirements. See Rudolph v. Galetka, 2002 UT 
7, If 10, 43 P.3d 467; State v. DeBooy, 2000 UT 32, [^28, 996 P.2d 546 (citing cases); Mohi, 
901 P.2d at 1009 (Russon, J., concurring and dissenting). Unless a statute impinges on a 
fundamental or specifically protected right, it is defendant's burden to overcome the 
presumption of constitutionality and prove the invalidity of a statute. See Mohi, 901 P.2d at 
996; Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Utah v. State, 779 P.2d 634, 637 (Utah 1989). 
7Defendant also argues that the direct-file statute violates the equal protection 
provision of the federal constitution. See Br. of Aplt. at 35-37. It is well-settled that 
"Utah's uniform operation of the laws provision is 'at least as exacting and in some 
circumstances, more rigorous than the standard applied under the federal constitution.'" 
Tindley, 2005 UT 30, \ 35 (quoting Whitmer v. City ofLindon, 943 P.2d 226, 230 (Utah 
1997) (additional quotations omitted); see also Blue Cross, 2005 UT 34, % 31. Both 
require the same basic analysis concerning the classifications identified by the challenged 
statute, the disparity, if any, in the treatment given those classifications, and the 
determination of whether that treatment serves a reasonable government objective. See 
Blue Cross, 2005 UT 34, ^ 31. Consequently, if the challenged statute does not violate 
article I, section 24 of the state constitution, it also does not violate Defendant's federal 
equal protection rights. See id. Because Defendant's argument fails under the state 
constitution, see accompanying text in Point 111(A), his federal equal protection claim 
fails. See Tindley, 2005 UT 30, f^ 35. Hence, this Court may limit its review to 
Defendant's state constitutional argument under article I, section 24. See id. 
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(1) Because Defendant has no right to prosecution for murder in juvenile court, 
heightened scrutiny does not apply 
Defendant asks that this Court review the direct-file statute with a heightened level of 
scrutiny, arguing that the statute "impinges upon the liberty and lives of our children[.]" See 
Br. of Aplt. at 24. Heightened review is unwarranted, however, because no fundamental right 
or suspect class is involved. See Tindley, 2005 UT 30, f^ 28; Gallivan v. Walker, 2002 UT 
89, ffif 39-41, 54 P.3d 1069); Bell, 785 P.2d at 398-99. 
Defendant repeats his argument that fundamental interests in life and liberty are at issue 
and warrant heightened scrutiny. See Br. of Aplt. at 24. As noted in Point II, supra, 
Defendant has not established the existence of either right in this case. Moreover, this Court 
has already rejected a heightened level of scrutiny for an Article I, section 24 challenge to 
the previous version of the direct-file statute on that very ground. See also Mohi, 901 P.2d 
at 995-97. 
Defendant also claims the existence of an education right, although he fails to establish 
that it is a fundamental right in this case. See Br. of Aplt. at 24. To the contrary, education 
generally is not a fundamental right. See Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202,221-23 (1982) (stating 
that "Public education is not a "right" granted to individuals by the Constitution^]" but 
recognizing its importance to society); see also Purdue v. University of Utah, 584 P.2d 831, 
833 (Utah 1978) (declining to declare post-graduated education as a fundamental right for 
purposes of heightened constitutional scrutiny). 
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Defendant relies solely on Plyler for this argument. A heightened level of scrutiny was 
applied in that case not because education was at issue, but because of the existence of 
numerous "countervailing costs" in the denial of public education to undocumented aliens. 
457 U.S. at 223. Such costs are not at issue here. Neither is Defendant in jeopardy of being 
denied an education because he is being prosecuted in adult court. Accordingly, in the 
context of this case, education does not amount to a fundamental right warranting heightened 
scrutiny of the direct-file statute. 
Finally, Defendant argues that age warrants heightened scrutiny in this case because 
courts afford children "special constitutional protections" for various reasons. See Br. of 
Aplt. at 24-25. However, age is not a suspect classification. See Purdue, 584 P.2d at 833; 
Bell, 785 P.2d at 399. Neither did the involvement of juveniles require heightened review 
of the direct-file statute in Mohi. See Mohi, 901 P.2d at 996-97. Defendant establishes no 
reason for a different result in this case. 
Consequently, this Court should reject Defendant's request for heightened scrutiny and 
should review his uniform operation of laws claim using the "rational basis" level of scrutiny. 
See Tindley, 2005 UT 30, f^ 30. That requires the Court to determine: 1) whether the 
classification created by the statute is reasonable; 2) whether the legislative objectives are 
legitimate; and 3) whether there is a reasonable relationship between the classification and 
the legislative objectives. See Tindley, 2005 UT 30, ^ 28; see also State v. Merrill, 2005 UT 
34, ffif 33-34, H4P.3d585. 
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Similarly, the absence of a fundamental right dictates that his state due process claim 
should be analyzed under a similar "rational basis" review: the statute will be upheld if it has 
'a reasonable relation to a proper legislative purpose, and [is] neither arbitrary nor 
discriminatory.5" Tindley, 2005 UT 30, ^ 29 (quoting Condemarin v. Univ. Hosp., 11 P.2d 
348, 356 (Utah 1989) (additional quotations omitted)). 
(2) The direct-file statute is not arbitrary in its creation of a distinct classification of 
juveniles, and it operates uniformly in that it does not provide disparate treatment in its 
actual operation 
Before a statute meets article I, section 24 of the state constitution, it must apply equally 
to all persons within the subject class, and "'the statutory classifications and the different 
treatment given the classes must be based on differences that have a reasonable tendency to 
further the objective of the statute.'" Merrill, 2005 UT 34, \ 33 (quoting Malan v. Lewis, 693 
P.2d 661, 670 (Utah 1984)). Similarly, under the due process clause, the statute will be 
upheld if it has "a reasonable relation to a proper legislative purpose, and is neither arbitrary 
nor discriminatory." Tindley, 2005 UT 30, \ 29 (quotations and alterations omitted). In 
addition, under article I, section 7, the statute can be neither arbitrary nor discriminatory and 
must have "a reasonable relation to a proper legislative purpose[.]" Id. at \ 28 (quotation 
omitted). 
The first step in an analysis under article I, section 24 is to determine what classifications 
are created by the challenged statute. See id., 2005 UT 34, ^ 33-35 (reiterating that "the 
creation of classes and the discrimination among them is inherent to all laws"); Mohi, 901 
P.2d at 997. In this case, the direct-file statute establishes two classes of juveniles: 1) 
-27-
juveniles age sixteen and seventeen who are charged with murder or aggravated murder; and 
2) all other juveniles, regardless of age, who are not charged with murder or aggravated 
murder. See Utah Code Ann. § 78A-6-701(l)(a). 
Defendant contends that the statute creates both an age-based classification and an 
offense-based classification. See Br. of Aplt. at 24. Although the statute uses both age and 
offense to define its classifications, it does not create any classification which is solely 
defined by one requirement or the other. The statute does not purport to subject all sixteen 
and seventeen year old juveniles to adult prosecution or all murderers, regardless of age, to 
adult prosecution. Consequently, the classification established by the statute and to be 
reviewed by this Court necessarily involves that subset of juveniles who are restricted by 
both age and offense. 
The second step is "whether the statute 'applies equally' to all members within each 
class or subclass." Mohi, 901 P.2d at 998 (quoting Malan, 693 P.2d at 670). Defendant 
argues that the statute's age requirement is arbitrary and provides disparate treatment to 
similarly-situated juveniles because it does not take into account the maturity or level of 
development of the juvenile offender. See Br. of Aplt. at 25-26, 34-35. He claims that the 
statute permits an immature or developmentally undeserving 16 or 17 year old juvenile 
charged with murder or aggravated murder to be tried as an adult while a younger 
juvenile of similar immaturity but charged with a different offense is tried as a juvenile. See 
Br. of Aplt. at 25-26. 
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His argument is unpersuasive because, while it compares juveniles with similar maturity 
or developmental levels, it fails to address similarly-situated juveniles within the class 
defined in the statute. See Mohi, 901 P.2d at 997 (the law is not uniform if "'persons 
similarly situated' are not 'treated similarly' . . . ." or if dissimilarly situated persons are 
treated the same) (quoting Malan, 693 P.2d at 669). The legislature has identified the direct-
file class as the entire group of violent juveniles defined by an express combination of age 
and offense, and has determined that the district court shall have exclusive original 
jurisdiction over these offenders irrespective of any other characteristics that may distinguish 
the juveniles from each other. The constitutionality of the statute turns on the unifonnity of 
its treatment of the members of this specific class, irrespective of external characteristics that 
may separate one from the other. See generally Merrill, 2005 UT 34, ^ 3 3 , 3 6 ; Mohi, 901 
P.2d at 997,1003 (noting that the legislature may except from the juvenile system a specified 
group of violent juveniles). 
Defendant's comparison of a group of sixteen- and seventeen-year-old accused 
murderers with a dissimilar group of younger juveniles who are not accused murderers does 
not establish disparate treatment within the classes as defined by the challenged statute. See 
Br. of Aplt. at 25-26. The characteristics common to his groups — maturity and 
development - do not test whether the statute applies equally to all persons within the 
legislatively-identified class. See Mohi, 901 P.2d at 998. 
Defendant then faults the statute's grouping by offense by arguing that it generates 
disparate treatment to similarly-situated juveniles by granting prosecutors unchecked "super 
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discretion" to choose the forum for prosecuting them. See Br. of Aplt. at 25-29. He argues 
that by manipulating the charge based on "any number of personal and even unconstitutional 
predilections[,]" the prosecutor is able to pursue in two different courts identical juveniles 
who commit identical crimes. See Br. of Aplt. at 25-29. 
Like Mohi9 the direct-file statute necessarily grants prosecutors some discretion in 
deciding how to proceed against juvenile criminal offenders. See Mohi, 901 P.2d at 1002-03. 
Unlike Mohi, however, the current statute permits the prosecutor no more than the exercise 
of traditional charging discretion before it steps in to direct the prosecutor's exercise of that 
discretion. See id. Traditional prosecutorial discretion necessarily involves the u[s]electi[on 
of] a charge to fit the circumstances of a defendant and his or her alleged acts[.]" Id. at 1003. 
The selection of a charge necessarily determines which elements must be proved at trial, and 
the prosecutor must make a legal determination as to whether those elements can likely be 
proved. See id. The prosecutor is aided in exercising this discretion by "the criteria provided 
. . . in the statute, the purpose of the Juvenile Courts Act, and the standards governing the 
duties of his or her office." Bell, 785 P.2d at 404 (quoted in Mohi, 901 P.2d at 1008 (Russon, 
J., concurring and dissenting)). So long as the determination is not based on arbitrary 
classifications, it is protected. See Mohi, 901 P.2d at 1003 (interpreting Bordenkircher v. 
Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 364 98 S. Ct. 663 (1978)). 
The statute in Mohi was stricken because it involved an open-ended discretion that was 
"unlike traditional prosecutor discretion/' See Mohi, 901 P.2d at 1002-03. The prosecutor 
was able to determine not only the charge to be filed, but where to file that charge without 
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any direction from the statute, resulting in disparate treatment of juveniles who were accused 
of the same offenses and who fell into the same age ranges. See id. at 998, 1002-03. 
In this case, once the prosecutor exercises his or her traditional discretion by deciding 
whether the elements of murder or aggravated murder may be established at trial and whether 
that charge fits the juvenile and alleged conduct, the statute directs his actions, thereby 
ensuring uniform treatment of the classes identified therein. If the prosecutor has decided 
to charge a sixteen or seventeen year old with murder or aggravated murder, the statute 
requires that the case be filed in adult court. See Utah Code Ann. § 78A-6-701(l)(a) ("The 
district court shall have exclusive original jurisdiction" over the class of sixteen or seventeen 
year old juveniles who are "charged by information or indictment" with murder or aggravated 
murder). If the decision is that the charge of murder or aggravated murder does not "fit the 
circumstances" of the accused or is not likely to be proven at trial, then the prosecutor cannot 
direct-file in adult court, but must proceed in the juvenile court. See Utah Code Ann. § 78A-
6-103. Thus, the current statute does away with the undirected discretion that defeated the 
previous statute and permitted disparate treatment of similarly-situated offenders. See Mo hi, 
901 P.2d at 1002-03. 
Defendant's assertion of greater, unfettered prosecutorial discretion rests on his 
assumption that the prosecutor is not only free to abuse the charging discretion but will do 
so by first determining the forum of choice and then filing the case so as to proceed in the 
chosen forum. See Br. of Aplt. at 26-27. He argues that the statute permits a prosecutor to 
over- or under-charge a case at will based on political, personal, erroneous, or otherwise 
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unconstitutional motivations, and that the absence of any provision for judicial review similar 
to that required for SYO and certification cases leaves the prosecutor with "greater 
prosecutorial discretion" than existed in the statute struck in Mohi. See id. at 26-28. 
While "[t]here is no doubt that the breadth of discretion that our country's legal system 
vests in prosecuting attorneys carries with it the potential for both individual and institutional 
abuse[,]" prosecutorial discretion in selecting an appropriate charge to fit a given defendant 
and his or her alleged acts is protected as "a necessary step" in the criminal system. See 
Bordenkircher, 434 U.S. at 365; Mohi, 901 P.2d at 1003. It is no less necessary merely 
because a statute dictates the forum based on the charging decision. The discretion to 
determine whether and which charges to file necessarily rests with the prosecutor. See 
Bordenkircher, 434 U.S. at 365; Mohi, 901 P.2d at 1003. That is all that the direct-file 
statute gives the prosecutor, because it circumscribes the exercise of any additional discretion 
by dictating the forum based on the prosecutor's charging decision. See Utah Code Ann. § 
78A-6-701(l)(a). 
It is this specific guidance that Mohi found was missing. See Mohi, 901 P.2d at 999, 
1002 (while there is a need to try certain violent juveniles as adults, the legislature "failed 
to specify which violent juveniles require such treatment") (emphasis in original). That door 
has now been closed by the age and offense requirements imposed by the direct-file statute, 
leaving for the prosecutor only that charging discretion which is necessary for any 
prosecution. See id. at 1002-03. Defendant offers no basis upon which this Court should 
presume that that charging discretion will be abused any more than in any other situation. 
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Defendant also does not assert that any abuse occurred in this case. See Br. of Aplt. at 26-27 
&nl2. 
Moreover, should a prosecutor be found by the district court to have overcharged a 
matter, the district court can remedy the situation. If the prosecutor overcharged conduct 
which would not "be murder or aggravated murder if committed by an adult," the matter may 
be transferred to the juvenile court either under section 78A-6-601 (requiring the transfer 
from district to juvenile court of matters involving juveniles which were not properly before 
the district court), or under subsection (3)(b) of the direct-file statute following dismissal of 
the suspect charge by the district court. See Utah Code Ann. § 78A-6-701(3)(b) (directing 
the transfer of the matter to the juvenile court upon dismissal of the qualifying charge). In 
either event, recourse is available upon establishment of the sort of prosecutorial abuse 
argued by Defendant. 
Accordingly, classifying juveniles by age and the charged offense is not 
unconstitutionally arbitrary or unreasonable, where that classification targets and treats a 
specific subset of violent juvenile offenders at which the legislative objectives are aimed. 
See Point 111(3), infra. 
(3) The direct-file statutory classification is based on and rationally related to a 
legitimate legislative goal of appropriate punishment and deterrence of and public 
safety from, the most violent juvenile criminals 
The final step in the uniform operation of laws analysis is to determine "whether there 
is a 'reasonable relationship' between the purpose of the Act and the means adopted by the 
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legislature to enact that purpose." Mohi, 901 P.2d at 998-99 (quoting Blue Cross, 779 P.2d 
at 637 and Malan, 693 P.2d at 670). 
In 1996, the Utah Legislature "changed its policy toward juveniles to address the 
increase in 'violent'juvenile crime." In reA.B., 936 P.2d at 1098; Mohi, 901 P.2d at 1007 
(Zimmerman, C J., concurring) (acknowledging the "real" problems of violent youth crime). 
The policy, which has not since been revised, provides: 
(5) The purpose of the court under this chapter is to: 
(a) promote public safety and individual accountability by the imposition 
of appropriate sanctions on persons who have committed acts in 
violation of law; 
(b) order appropriate measures to promote guidance and control, 
preferably in the minor's own home, as an aid in the prevention of future 
unlawful conduct and the development of responsible citizenship; 
(c) where appropriate, order rehabilitation, reeducation, and treatment for 
persons who have committed acts bringing them within the court's 
jurisdiction; 
(d) adjudicate matters that relate to minors who are beyond parental or 
adult control and to establish appropriate authority over these minors by 
means of placement and control orders; 
(e) adjudicate matters that relate to abused, neglected, and dependent 
minors and to provide care and protection for these minors by placement, 
protection, and custody orders; 
(f) remove a minor from parental custody only where the minor's safety 
or welfare, or the public safety, may not otherwise be adequately 
safeguarded; and 
(g) consistent with the ends of justice, strive to act in the best interests 
of the minor's [sic] in all cases and attempt to preserve and strengthen 
family ties where possible. 
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Utah Code Ann. § 78A-6-102(5). The policy statement deliberately emphasizes as its first 
purpose the promotion of public safety, personal accountability, and sanctions for improper 
behavior before addressing in subsection (c) the rehabilitation of juveniles "where 
appropriate.5' Id.; In re A.B., 936 P.2d at 1098-99. 
The legitimacy of promoting public safety and individual accountability was recognized 
by this Court in Mohi. See Mohi, 901 P.2d at 999. This Court also recognized the existence 
of a legitimate need to try certain violent juveniles as adults in furtherance of the legislative 
purpose. See id. That version of the statute failed to adequately address that need, however, 
because the legislature "failed to specify which violent juveniles require" adult prosecution. 
Id. (emphasis in original). 
The present version of the direct-file statute is clearly part of a legislative effort to cure 
that deficiency and to confront the realities of serious violent youth offenders in accordance 
with the legislature's policy statement. See In re A.B., 936 P.2d at 1098 (noting that Mohi 
was the impetus for the statutory changes relating to violent juvenile offenders); Mohi, 901 
P.2d at 1007 (Zimmerman, C.J., concurring) (discussing the then-recent enactment of the 
present version of the direct-file statute). See also Senate Debate on SB 111,51st Leg., Gen. 
Sess. (Utah Feb. 9,1995) (statement of Rep. Hillyard) (stating that the bill, which addressed 
direct-filing, certification, and the SYOA, was meant to be an improvement over the law 
enacted the previous year aimed at "addressing] the serious problems of gang and youth 
violence" and that the direct-file part of the bill was aimed at remedying the problem 
pending before the Utah Supreme Court in Mohi) (R. 105-06). By removing from the 
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juvenile system the specific class of oldest, most violent juvenile offenders, and placing 
them in the adult system, the direct-file statute furthers the protection of society, advances 
individual accountability, and promotes the imposition of appropriate sanctions—all 
regarded by the legislature as the primary purpose behind the Juvenile Court Act. See Utah 
Code Ann. § 78A-6-102(5)(a). It permits the accused all the constitutional protections 
attendant to a criminal prosecution while, in the event of a conviction, providing a range of 
sentencing options designed to deal both with violent offenders and with societal protection. 
Defendant contends that the direct-file statute is not rationally related to its purpose for 
three reasons. First, he argues that while the statutory purposes are legitimate, the direct-file 
statute is entirely arbitrary. See Br. of Aplt. at 28-29, 34-35. Specifically, he argues that the 
statute does not promote public safety or individual accountability because of the 
"categorical" classifications it employs. See id. at 29. His concern is that not all sixteen and 
seventeen year olds are equally deserving of adult prosecution in light of their development 
differences. See id. at 24-25, 29. 
To the contrary, the statute's age and offense restrictions target precisely those juveniles 
with which the legislative policy is concerned: the oldest and most violent juvenile 
offenders. Regardless of their developmental level, these individuals choose to commit the 
most violent offenses. Given their age, these individuals have the most limited time 
remaining in the juvenile system. And because of their offenses, they require the most 
intense "sentencing" available under that system. Moreover, they present the biggest 
concern to societal safety because of their willingness to commit violent offenses and 
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because of the limited ability of the juvenile system to adequately address the problem 
within the short time left to it. In addition, their presence in the juvenile system necessarily 
affects other less serious juvenile offenders, giving rise to a concern for serious adverse 
effects of peer interaction. See In re A.B., 936 P.2d at 1098-99 (citing this as concern 
legitimately addressed by the S YO statute). The treatment of such violent juvenile offenders 
in the adult criminal system mitigates each of these concerns, providing more appropriate 
sanctions in light of the violent behavior and the offender's circumstances, promoting 
individual accountability, using the time and resources necessary to adequately address the 
offender's needs and developmental level, and better serving the public safety concern. 
Second, Defendant contends that the direct-file statute fails to achieve the legislative 
objectives because it allows prosecutors unfettered discretion to manipulate the choice of 
forum. See Br. of Aplt. at 30. But unlike the statute in Mohi, the current statute provides 
for no more than the traditional prosecutorial charging discretion, circumscribing any further 
discretion by using age and offense to categorize the crimes deserving of adult treatment and 
mandating uniform treatment of all individuals in the identified class. See subsection (2), 
supra. 
Finally, Defendant contends that, even assuming the policy is served by sending more 
violent offenders to the adult system, the direct-file system "does nothing" to meet the policy 
because the policy is "already served by the certification statutes." Br. of Aplt. at 30-31. 
This Court's responsibility, however, is to determine the constitutionality of the direct-file 
statute, not to determine whether it is the "optimal method" for achieving the legislative 
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goals. See Tindley, 2005 UT 30, \ 32 (quoting Judd, 2004 UT 91, ^ 15, 103 P.3d 135). 
Moreover, the legislature's implementation of the various statutes that comprise the 
interrelated scheme it adopted to address juvenile offenders demonstrates its belief that its 
objectives are not best served by a single approach to all juveniles or to all juvenile crime. 
See In re A.B., 936 P.2d at 1098 (noting that the legislature is free to set its own policy 
regarding the juvenile system and interpreting-the SYO statute in light of "clear" policy 
toward violent juvenile crime demonstrated by the interrelated statutory scheme). 
Accordingly, the existence of a related but not identical statute addressed to a different 
classification of juvenile offender and providing different treatment for that offender does 
not prevent the direct-file statute from effectively addressing legislative concerns relative 
to public safety, individual accountability, appropriate punishment, and deterrence with 
regard to the most violent juvenile offenders. 
In sum, the direct-file statute, requiring adult prosecution of sixteen-and seventeen-year-
old juveniles charged with murder or aggravated murder, is rationally related to the 
legislature's objective of "balancing the needs of children with public protection," because 
it identifies by age and offense the oldest and most violent juvenile offenders and it directs 
the prosecutor's discretion so as to permit uniform treatment of all similarly-situated 
juveniles. Mohi, 901 P.2d at 1002. Hence, the statute complies with both article I, section 
24, and article I, section 7, of the state constitution. 
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B. State Prohibition of Special Laws 
Defendant also alleges a violation of the state constitutional prohibition against 
enactment of special laws, article VI, section 26. See Br. of Aplt. at 33-34. "[A] special law 
is a law that classifies its objects unreasonably, as by selecting from a general class particular 
persons, places, or things for the purpose of conferring privileges or imposing burdens." 
Blue Cross, 779 P.2d at 645. 
Defendant contends that the direct-file statute creates an "unnatural classification!]" by 
separating juvenile offenders for prosecution and punishment by age without regard for their 
developmental differences. See Br. of Aplt. at 33-34. He also argues that the separation of 
juveniles by age and offense creates an unnatural division to which the legislature seeks to 
apply a special law in violation of article VI, section 26. See id. at 34. 
This Court should reject his arguments in light of the constitutional argument, supra. 
Article I, section 26, is generally viewed as "the flip side" of the uniform operation of laws 
analysis. See Blue Cross, 779 P.2d at 645. "If a law satisfies the requirement of article I, 
section 24, that all laws of'a general nature shall have uniform operation,' it will not violate 
article VI, section 26." Id. 
The constitutional analysis above establishes that the direct-file statute meets the 
requirements of article I, section 24. The statute defines a particular class of violent juvenile 
offender and provides for uniform treatment of that class in the adult courts in furtherance 
of its stated policies. See subsection (3), supra. Absent a violation of the uniform 
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operations of laws provision, this Court should find no violation of the special laws ban of 
article VI, section 26. See id 
POINT V 
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY DENIED DEFENDANT'S MOTION 
TO DISMISS BASED ON AN APPROPRIATE INTERPRETATION 
OF THE RELEVANT STATUTES 
Defendant also challenges the trial court's rejection of his interpretation of the Juvenile 
Court Act as requiring that his case be adjudicated in juvenile court. See Br. of Aplt. at 41-
46; Add. C. 
As stated, the direct-file statute provides 
§ 78A-6-701. Jurisdiction of district court. 
(1) The district court shall have exclusive original jurisdiction over all persons 
16 years of age or older charged by information or indictment with; 
(a) an offense which would be murder or aggravated murder if committed 
by an adul t . . . . 
Utah Code Ann. § 78A-6-701(l). Defendant argues that the direct-file statute conflicts with 
a statute explaining the civil nature of juvenile proceedings: 
§ 78A-6-116. Minor's cases considered civil proceedings—Adjudication of 
jurisdiction by juvenile court not conviction of crime, exceptions—Minor not 
to be charged with crime, exception—Traffic violation cases, abstracts to 
Department of Public Safety 
(1) Except as provided in Sections 78A-6-702 [Serious Youth Offender Act] 
and 78A-6-703 [Certification Hearings], proceedings in a minor's case shall be 
regarded as a civil proceeding with the court exercising equitable powers. 
(3) A minor may not be charged with a crime or convicted in any court except 
as provided in Sections 78A-6-702 [SYO statute] and 78A-6-703 [certification 
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statute], and in cases involving traffic violations. When a petition has been filed in 
the juvenile court, the minor may not later be subjected to criminal prosecution 
based on the same facts except as provided in Section 78A-6-702 or 78A-6-703. 
Utah Code Ann. § 78A-6-116 (West Supp. 2009). He points out that subsection (3) excepts 
only the certification and SYO statutes from juvenile civil proceedings. He argues that the 
omission of the direct-file statute from the exceptions was intentional, and, inasmuch as he 
was not charged under the SYO or the certification statutes, his case "should be adjudicated 
as a civil matter in a juvenile court[.]" See Br. of Aplt. at 41-46. The trial court's 
interpretation to the contrary, he argues, is flawed because it is contrary to rules of statutory 
interpretation, it generates conflict both within section 78A-6-116 and between section 78A-
6-116 and other parts of the Juvenile Court Act, and it exceeds the trial court's judicial 
bounds by inporting substantive terms into the statute.8 See id. at 43-46. 
When a statutory provision causes conflict or doubt in its application, this Court must 
"analyze the act in its entirety and harmonize its provisions in accordance with the legislative 
defendant includes two additional challenges to the trial court's decision. He 
argues that the trial court erred in ruling that the direct-file statute granted the prosecutor 
only the traditional charging discretion that accompanied all criminal cases. See Br. of 
Aplt. at 38-40. The State has addressed this argument supra, at Point IV(3). 
He alsoxhallenges the trial court's refusal to reach his multiple constitutional 
challenges to the direct-file statute. See Br. of Aplt. at 40-41; Add. C. He notes the cases 
which support the trial court's reasoning, then repeats the request he made in Point II of 
his brief that this Court overturn that precedent. See id. at 40-41 & nl8. That request is 
discussed in Point III, supra. Because the trial court was bound by existing precedent and 
followed it after properly determining that the direct-file statute granted only appropriate 
prosecutorial charging discretion and resulted in exclusive, original jurisdiction over this 
case to the district court, Judge Trease did not err in refusing to reach Defendant's 
remaining constitutional claims. 
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intent and purpose." State v. Miller, 2008 UT 61, lj 19,193 P.3d 92 (quoting State v. B/z^ 
2002 UT 66, Tj 34, 52 P.3d 1210); IML. v. State, 2002 UT 110, «[ 26, 61 P.3d 1038 (courts 
have "an obligation to harmonize alleged inconsistencies within and between statutes, 
avoiding conflicts when possible."). There exists a fundamental duty to avoid "'any 
interpretation which renders parts or words in a statute inoperative or superfluous[.]'" State 
v. Morrison, 2001 UT 73, ^ 11,31 P.3d 547 (quoting Madsen v. Borthick, 769 P.2d 245,252 
n.l l (Utah 1988) mdState v. Hunt, 906 P.2d 311, 312 (Utah 1995)) (additional quotations 
omitted). 
This Court should affirm the trial court's interpretation of section 78A-6-116 because 
Defendant's interpretation renders the direct-file statute superfluous and inoperable. In 
contrast, the trial court properly viewed the statutes in a broader light, harmonizing them 
with the general purposes of the Juvenile Court Act and reconciling them so as to avoid any 
conflict. See Add. C. 
The Juvenile Court Act begins by establishing the jurisdiction of the juvenile court: 
(1) Except as otherwise provided by law, the juvenile court has exclusive original 
jurisdiction in proceedings concerning: 
(1) a child who has violated any federal, state, or local law or municipal 
ordinance or a person younger than 21 years of age who has violated any 
law or ordinance before becoming 18 years of age, regardless of where 
the violation occurred, excluding offenses in Subsection 78A-7-106(2) 
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Utah Code Ann. §78A-6-103(1) (emphasis added).9 The law "otherwise provided" in 
1996—when the legislature created the stand-alone direct-file statute—and gave the district 
court exclusive jurisdiction over the most violent juvenile offenders. See Utah Code Ann. 
§ 78-3a-601 (1996). That language remains in the present statute, which provides that "[t]he 
district court shall have exclusive original jurisdiction" over sixteen-and seventeen-year-olds 
accused of murder and aggravated murder. See Utah Code Ann. § 78A-6-701(l). It is clear 
that the legislature removed those matters from the juvenile courts and, having granted 
exclusive jurisdiction of them to the district court, did not need to mention them in other 
general provisions of the Juvenile Court Act which involve only juvenile court adjudications. 
Section 78A-6-116 is one of those provisions. As the trial court tried to explain, section 
78A-6-116 elaborates on juvenile court proceedings in cases involving minors. See Add. C; 
see Utah Code Ann. § 78A-6-116(l)-(6). The reference to SYO and certification 
proceedings and traffic violations identify matters over which the juvenile court may, in 
whole or in part, exercise its jurisdiction. Both SYO and certification proceedings begin in 
the juvenile court, and the juvenile court exercises exclusive jurisdiction over a number of 
traffic matters while sharing jurisdiction over others with justice and district courts. See Utah 
Code Ann. § 78A-6-103 (jurisdiction of juvenile court); § 78A-7-106(2) (jurisdiction of 
justice court over limited juvenile offenses "[ejxcept those offenses over which the juvenile 
court has exclusive jurisdiction"); § 78A-5-102(9) (district court has jurisdiction over 
9Section 78A-7-106(2) lists specific matters involving persons 16 years of age or 
older over which justice courts have jurisdiction, and excludes "offenses over which the 
juvenile court has exclusive jurisdiction." See Utah Code Ann. § 78A-7-106(2). 
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juvenile matters noted in section 78A-7-106 if there is no justice court). The provisions of 
section 78A-6-116 do not purport to address matters within the district court's original 
exclusive jurisdiction and, hence, should not be read to defeat the grant of exclusive and 
original jurisdiction to the district court in the direct-file statute. 
Defendant identifies a new conflict for the first time on appeal. He contends that the 
direct-file statute cannot be reconciled with section 78A-6-601, which requires that district 
court judges transfer juvenile cases back to the juvenile courts unless they arrive in district 
court by means of SYO or certification statutes.10 See Br. of Aplt. at 45. Defendant's 
argument ignores the fact that the direct-file statute represents a grant of "exclusive original 
jurisdiction" of direct-file matters to the district court, thereby leaving no conflict. See Utah 
Code Ann. § 78A-6-701(l). 
Section 78A-6-601 applies only to those matters over which the juvenile court may 
exercise some jurisdiction, as demonstrated by its express exclusion from its terms of only 
those matters which at some level involve juvenile court jurisdiction. See Utah Code Ann. 
§ 78A-6-601(l). Direct-file matters, however, have been expressly excepted from juvenile 
10Utah Code Ann. § 78A-6-601(l) (West Supp. 2009), provides 
(1) If, during the pendency of a criminal or quasi-criminal proceeding in 
another court, including a preliminary hearing, it is determined that the 
person charged is under 21 years of age and was less than 18 years of age at 
the time of committing the alleged offense, that court shall transfer the case 
to the juvenile court, together with all the papers, documents, and 
transcripts of any testimony except as provided in Sections 78A-6-702 
[SYO] and 78A-6-703 [certification]. 
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court jurisdiction, and, hence, need not be excepted from section 78A-6-601 in order to 
remain in the district court. 
Further, the grant of exclusive original jurisdiction to the district court over a specific 
class of juvenile case involving the older and most violent juvenile offenders was part of the 
legislature's solution to rising and increasingly violent juvenile crime: the certification 
statute, the SYO, and the direct-file statute. See Utah Code Ann. §§ 78A-6-701, -702, and 
-703; see also Utah Code Ann. §78A-6-102(5) (setting forth the policy behind the Juvenile 
Court Act and stressing the protection of the public and individual accountability and 
punishment). The trial court's interpretation properly harmonizes and reconciles the related 
statutes with the entirety of the Act, giving meaning and effect to each provision while 
avoiding the conflicts arising from Defendant's interpretation. As such, it represents the 
appropriate interpretation of the relevant statutes, and Defendant's claim to the contrary 
should be rejected. 
CONCLUSION 
Because the direct-file statute is constitutional under state constitutional provisions 
involving due process, uniform operation of laws, and prohibition against special laws, and 
does not violate the Federal Equal Protection Clause, this Court should reject Defendant's 
arguments and affirm the trial court's denial of his motion to dismiss. 
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ADDENDUM A 
UTAH CONSTITUTION: Art. I, §7 
Art. I, § 24 
Art. VI, § 26 
U.S. CONSTITUTION: Amend. XIV 
CONSTITUTION OF UTAH 
Sec . "7, I Hue process of law] 
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property, without due process 
of law. 
S e c . 2 4 . [Uniform operation of laws] 
All laws of a general nature shall have uniiorni operation. 
S e c . 2 6 . [Private laws forbidden] 
No private oi special law shall be enacted where a general law can be 
applicable. 
CONSTITUTION OF THE 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
Amendment XIV. Citizenship; privileges and immunities; due process; 
equal protection; apportionment of representation; disqualification of 
officers; public debt; enforcement 
Section 1. All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject 
to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State 
wherein they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall 
abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall 
any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of 
law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the 
laws. 
Section 2. Representatives shall be apportioned among the several States 
according to their respective numbers, counting the whole number of persons 
in each State, excluding Indians not taxed. But when the right to vote at any 
election for the choice of electors for President and Vice President of the United 
States, Representatives in Congress, the Executive and Judicial officers of a 
State, or the members of the Legislature thereof, is denied to any of the male 
inhabitants of such State, being twenty-one years of age, and citizens of the 
United States, or in any way abridged, except for participation in rebellion, or 
other crime, the basis of representation therein shall be reduced in the propor-
tion which the number of such male citizens shall bear to the whole number of 
male citizens twenty-one years of age in such State. 
Section 3. No person shall be a Senator or Representative in Congress, or 
elector of President and Vice President, or hold any office, civil or military, 
under the United States, or under any State, who, having previously taken an 
oath, as a member of Congress, or as an officer of the United States, or as a 
member of any State legislature, or as an executive or judicial officer of any 
State, to support the Constitution of the United States, shall have engaged in 
insurrection or rebellion against the same, or given aid or comfort to the 
enemies thereof. But Congress may by a vote of two-thirds of each House, 
remove such disability. 
Section 4. The validity of the public debt of the United States, authorized by 
law, including debts incurred for payment of pensions and bounties for services 
in suppressing insurrection or rebellion, shall not be questioned. But neither 
the United States nor any State shall assume or pay any debt or obligation 
incurred in aid of insurrection or rebellion against the United States, or any 
claim for the loss or emancipation of any slave; but all such debts, obligations 
and claims shall be held illegal and void. 
Section 5. The Congress shall have power to enforce, by appropriate 
legislation, the provisions of this article. 
ADDENDUM B 
L K A I ("ODE AlNJN. ^ /«a-()-M» i < West Supp. 2009) 
11 T,\H CODE ANN. § 78a-6-701 (West Supp. 2009) 
UTAH CODE ANN. $ 78a-- '"" * \\ ^ ' 
I i , ! ( ()l)l \NN '} "'Xa-<) "(n l^Vst S-ipi' , ! W 
§ 78A-6 403 
§ 78A-6-103. Jur isdic t ion of juvenile court—Original—Exclusive 
(1) Except as otherwise provided by law, the juvenile court has exclusive original jurisdic-
tion in proceedings concerning: 
(a) a child who has violated any federal, state, or local law or municipal ordinance or a 
person younger than 21 years of age who has violated any law or ordinance before 
becoming 18 years of age, regardless of where the violation occurred, excluding offenses in 
Subsection 78A-7-106(2); 
(b) a person 21 years of age or older who has failed or refused to comply with an order 
of the juvenile court to pay a fine or restitution, if the order was imposed prior to the 
person's 21st birthday; however, the continuing jurisdiction is limited to causing compli-
ance with existing orders; 
(c) a child who is an abused child, neglected child, or dependent child, as those terms are 
defined in Section 78A-6-105; 
(d) a protective order for a child pursuant to the provisions of Title 78B, Chapter 7, Part 
2, Child Protective Orders, which the juvenile court may transfer to the district court if the 
juvenile court has entered an ex parte protective order and finds that: 
(i) the petitioner and the respondent are the natural parent, adoptive parent, or step 
parent of the child who is the object of the petition; 
(ii) the district court has a petition pending or an order related to custody or parent-
time entered under Title 30, Chapter 3, Divorce, Title 78B, Chapter 7, Part 1, Cohabitant 
Abuse Act, or Title 78B, Chapter 15, Utah Uniform Parentage Act, in which the 
petitioner and the respondent are parties; and 
(iii) the best interests of the child will be better served in the district court; 
(e) appointment of a guardian of the person or other guardian of a minor who comes 
within the court's jurisdiction under other provisions of this section; 
(f) the emancipation of a minor in accordance with Part 8, Emancipation; 
(g) the termination of the legal parent-child relationship in accordance with Part 5, 
Termination of Parental Rights Act, including termination of residual parental rights and 
duties; 
(h) the treatment or commitment of a mentally retarded minor; 
(i) a minor who is a habitual truant from school; 
(j) the judicial consent to the marriage of a child under age 16 upon a determination of 
voluntariness or where otherwise required by law, employment, or enlistment of a child 
when consent is required by law; 
(k) any parent or parents of a child committed to a secure youth corrections facility, to 
order, at the discretion of the court and on the recommendation of a secure facility, the 
parent or parents of a child committed to a secure facility for a custodial term, to undergo 
group rehabilitation therapy under the direction of a secure facility therapist, who has 
supervision of that parent's or parents' child, or any other therapist the court may direct, 
for a period directed by the court as recommended by a secure facility; 
(/) a minor under Title 55, Chapter 12, Interstate Compact for Juveniles; 
(m) the treatment or commitment of a mentally ill child. The-court may commit a child 
to the physical custody of a local mental health authority in accordance with the procedures 
and requirements of Title 62A, Chapter 15, Part 7, Commitment of Persons Under Age 18 
to Division of Substance Abuse and Mental Health , but not directly to the Utah State 
Hospital; 
in) the commitment of a child in accordance with Section 62A-15-301; 
••o) de novo review of final agency actions resulting from an informal adjudicative 
proceeding as provided in Section 63G-4-402; and 
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(p; adoptions conducted in accordance with the procedures described in Title 78B, 
Chapter 6, Part 1, Utah Adoption Act, when the juvenile court has previously entered an 
order terminating the rights of a parent and finds that adoption is in the best interest of 
the child. 
(2) Notwithstanding Section 78A-7-106 and Subsection 78A-5-102(9), the juvenile court 
has exclusive jurisdiction over the following offenses committed by a child: 
(a) Title 41, Chapter 6a, Part 5, Driving Under the Influence and Reckless Driving; 
(b) Section 73-18-12, reckless operation; and 
(c) class B and C misdemeanors, infractions, or violations of ordinances that are part of a 
single criminal episode filed in a petition that contains an offense over which the court has 
jurisdiction. 
(3) The juvenile court has jurisdiction over an ungovernable or runaway child who is 
referred to it by the Division of Child and Family Services or by public or private agencies 
that contract with the division to provide services to that child where, despite earnest and 
persistent efforts by the division or agency, the child has demonstrated that the child: 
(a) is beyond the control of the child's parent, guardian, lawful custodian, or school 
authorities to the extent that the child's behavior or condition endangers the child's own 
welfare or the welfare of others; or 
(b) has run away from home. 
(4) This section does not restrict the right of access to the juvenile court by private 
agencies or other persons. 
(5) The juvenile court has jurisdiction of all magistrate functions relative to cases arising 
under Section 78A-6-702. 
(6) The juvenile court has jurisdiction to make a finding of substantiated, unsubstantiated. 
or without merit, in accordance with Section 78A-6-323. 
(7) The juvenile court has jurisdiction of matters transferred to it by another trial court 
pursuant to Subsection 78A-7-106f7>) 
§ 78A-6-70L Jurisdiction of district court 
(1) The district court shall have exclusive original jurisdiction over all persons lb yeur£ of 
age or older charged by information or indictment with: 
(a) an offense which would be murder or aggravated murder if committed by an adult; 
or 
(b) an offense which would be a felony if committed by an adult if the minor has been 
previously committed to a secure facility as defined in Section 62A-7-101 This Subsection 
(l)(b) shall not apply if the offense is committed in a secure facility. 
(2) When the district court has exclusive original jurisdiction over a minor under i his 
section, it also has exclusive original jurisdiction over the minor regarding all offenses joined 
with the qualifying offense, and any other offenses, including misdemeanors, arising from the 
same criminal episode. The district court is not divested of jurisdiction by virtue of the fact 
that the minor is allowed to enter a plea to, or is found guilty of, a lesser or joined offense. 
(3)(a) Any felony, misdemeanor, or infraction committed after the offense over which the 
district court takes jurisdiction under Subsection (1) or (2) shall be tried against the 
defendant as an adult in the district court or justice court having jurisdiction. 
(b) If the qualifying charge under Subsection (1) results in an acquittal, a finding oi not 
guilty, or a dismissal of the charge in the district court, the juvenile court under Section 
78A-6-103 and the Division of Juvenile Justice Services regain jurisdiction and any 
authority previously exercised over the minor. 
§ 78A-6-702. Serious youth offender—Procedure 
(1) Any action filed by a county attorney, district attorney, or attorney general charging a 
minor 16 years of age or older with a felony shall be by criminal information and filed in the 
juvenile court if the information charges any of the following offenses: 
(a) any felony violation of: 
(i) Section 76-6-103, aggravated arson; 
(ii) Subsection 76-5-103(l)(a), aggravated assault, involving intentionally causing seri-
ous bodily injury to another; 
(iii) Section 76-5-302, aggravated kidnaping; 
(iv) Section 76-6-203, aggravated burglary; 
(v) Section 76-6-302, aggravated robbery; 
(vi) Section 76-5-405, aggravated sexual assault; 
(vii) Section 76-10-508, discharge of a firearm from a vehicle; 
(viii) Section 76-5-202, attempted aggravated murder; or 
(ix) Section 76-5-203, attempted murder; or 
(b) an offense other than those listed in Subsection (l)(a) involving the use of a 
dangerous weapon which would be a felony if committed by an adult, and the minor has 
been previously adjudicated or convicted of an offense involving the use of a dangerous 
weapon which also would have been a felony if committed by an adult. 
(2) All proceedings before the juvenile court related to charges tiled under Subsection (1) 
shall be conducted in conformity with the rules established by the Utah Supreme Court. 
(3)(a) If the information alleges the violation of a felony listed in Subsection (1), the state 
shall have the burden of going forward with its case and the burden of proof to establish 
probable cause to believe that one of the crimes listed in Subsection (1) has been committed 
and that the defendant committed it. If proceeding under Subsection (l)(b), the state shall 
have the additional burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant 
has previously been adjudicated or convicted of an offense involving the use of a dangerous 
weapon. 
(b) If the juvenile court judge finds the state has met its burden under this Subsection 
(3), the court shall order that the defendant be bound over and held to answer in the 
district court in the same manner as an adult unless the juvenile court judge finds that all 
of the following conditions exist: 
(i) the minor has not been previously adjudicated delinquent for an offense involving 
the use of a dangerous weapon which would be a felony if committed by an adult; 
(ii) that if the offense was committed with one or more other persons, the minor 
appears to have a lesser degree of culpability than the codefendants; and 
(iii) that the minor's role in the offense was not committed in a violent, aggressive, or 
premeditated manner. 
(c) Once the state has met its burden under this Subsection (3) as to a showing of 
probable cause, the defendant shall have the burden of going forward and presenting 
evidence as to the existence of the above conditions. 
(d) If the juvenile court judge finds by clear and convincing evidence that all the above 
conditions are satisfied, the court shall so state in its findings and order the minor held for 
trial as a minor and shall proceed upon the information as though it were a juvenile 
petition. 
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(4) If the juvenile court judge finds that an offense has been committed, but that the state 
has not met its burden of proving the other criteria needed to bind the defendant over under 
Subsection (1), the juvenile court judge shall order the defendant held for trial as a minor and 
shall proceed upon the information as though it were a juvenile petition. 
(5) At the time of a bind over to district court a criminal warrant of arrest shall issue. "':•«• 
defendant shall have the same right to bail as any other criminal defendant and shal! in* 
advised of that right by the juvenile court judge. The juvenile court shall set inirinl Im;' in 
accordance with Title 77, Chapter 20, Bail. 
6) If an indictment is returned by a grand jury charging a violation under this section, the 
I inary examination held by the juvenile court judge need not include a finding of 
probable cause that the crime alleged in the indictment wTas committed and that the defendant 
committed it, but the juvenile court shall proceed in accordance with this section regarding 
the additional considerations listed in Subsection (3)(b). 
(7) When a defendant is charged with multiple criminal offenses in the same information or 
indictment and is bound over to answer in the district court for one or more charges under 
this section, other offenses arising from the same criminal episode and any subsequent 
misdemeanors or felonies charged against him shall be considered together with those 
charges, and where the court finds probable cause to believe that those crimes have been 
committed and that the defendant committed them, the defendant shall also be bound over to 
the district court to answer for those charges. 
(8) A minor who is bound over to answer as an adult in the district court under this section 
or on whom an indictment has been returned by a grand jury is not entitled to a preliminary 
examination in the district court, 
(9) Allegations contained in the indictment or information that the defendant has previous-
ly been adjudicated or convicted of an offense involving the use of a dangerous weapon, or is 
16 years of age or older, are not elements of the criminal offense and do not need to be 
proven at trial in the district court. 
(10) If a minor enters a plea to, or is found guilty of, any of the charges filed or any other 
offense arising from the same criminal episode, the district court retains jurisdiction over the 
minor for all purposes, including sentencing. 
(11) The juvenile court under Section 78A-6-103 and the Division of Juvenile Justice 
Services regain jurisdiction and any authority previously exercised over the minor when there 
is an acquittal, a finding of not guilty, or dismissal of all charges in the district court. 
§ 78A-6-703. Certification hearings—Juvenile court to hold preliminary hear-
ing—Factors considered by juvenile court for waiver of jurisdiction to 
district court 
(1) If a criminal information filed in accordance with Subsection 78A-6-602(3) alleges the 
commission of an act which would constitute a felony if committed by an adult, the juvenile 
court shall conduct a preliminary hearing. 
(2) At the preliminary hearing the state shall have the burden of going forward with its 
case and the burden of establishing: 
(a) probable cause to believe that a crime was committed and that the defendant 
committed it; and 
(b) by a preponderance of the evidence, that it would be contrary to the best interests of 
the minor or of the public for the juvenile court to retain jurisdiction. 
(3) In considering whether or not it would be contrary to the best interests of the minor or 
of the public for the juvenile court to retain jurisdiction, the juvenile court shall consider, and 
may base its decision on, the finding of one or more of the following factors: 
(a) the seriousness of the offense and whether the protection of the community requires 
isolation of the minor beyond that afforded by juvenile facilities; 
(b) whether the alleged offense was committed by the minor in concert with two or more 
persons under circumstances which would subject the minor to enhanced penalties under 
Section 76-3-203.1 were he an adult; 
(c) whether the alleged offense was committed in an aggressive, violent, premeditated, or 
willful manner; 
(d) whether the alleged offense was against persons or property, greater weight being 
given to offenses against persons, except as provided in Section 76-8-418; 
(e) the maturity of the minor as determined by considerations of his home, environment, 
emotional attitude, and pattern of living; 
(f) the record and previous history of the minor; 
(g) the likelihood of rehabilitation of the minor by use of facilities available to the 
juvenile court; 
(h) the desirability of trial and disposition of the entire offense in one court when the 
minor's associates in the alleged offense are adults who will be charged with a crime in the 
district court; 
(i; whether the minor used a firearm in the commission of an offense; and 
( > whether the minor possessed a dangerous weapon on or about school premises a.3 
-divided m Section 76-10-505.5. 
'4) The amount of weight to be given to each of the factors listed in Subsection (3) is 
rhg'retionary with the court. 
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io'Ka) Written reports and other materials relating to the minor's mental, physical, edu-
cational, and social history may be considered by the court. 
(b) If requested by the minor, the minor's parent, guardian, or other interested party, 
the court shall require the person or agency preparing the report and other material to 
appear and be subject to both direct and cross-examination. 
(6) At the conclusion of the state's case, the minor may testify under oath, call witnesses, 
cross-examine adverse witnesses, and present evidence on the factors required by Subsection 
(3). 
<7) If the court finds the state has met its burden under Subsection (2), the court, may 
enter an order: 
(a) certifying that finding; and 
(b) directing that the minor be held for criminal proceedings in the district court. 
(8) If an indictment is returned by a grand jury, the preliminary examination held by the 
juvenile court need not include a finding of probable cause, but the juvenile court shall 
proceed in accordance with this section regarding the additional consideration referred to in 
Subsection (2)(b). 
(9) The provisions of Section 78A-6-115, Section 78A-6-1111, and other provisions relating 
to proceedings in juvenile cases are applicable to the hea ring held under this section to the 
extent they are pertinent. 
(10) A minor who has been directed to be held for criminal proceedings in the district court 
is not entitled to a preliminary examination in the district court. 
(11) A minor who has been certified for trial in the district court shall have the same right 
to bail as any other criminal defendant and shall be advised of that right by the juvenile court 
judge. The juvenile court shall set initial bail in accordance with Title 77, Chapter 20, Bail. 
(12) When a minor has been certified to the district court under this section or when a 
criminal information or indictment is filed in a court of competent jurisdiction before a 
committing magistrate charging the minor with an offense described in Section 78A-6-702, 
the jurisdiction of the Division of Juvenile Justice Services and the jurisdiction of the juvenile 
court over the minor is terminated regarding that offense, any other offenses arising from the 
same criminal episode, and any subsequent misdemeanors or felonies charged against him, 
except as provided in Subsection (14). 
(13) If a minor enters a plea to, or is found guilty of any of the charges filed or on any 
other offense arising out of the same criminal episode, the district court, retains jurisdiction 
over the minor for all purposes, including sentencing. 
(14) The juvenile court under Section 78A-6-103 and the Division of Juvenile Justice 
Services regain jurisdiction and any authority previously exercised over the minor when there 
is an acmrittal. a finding: of not guilty, or dismissal of all charges in the district court. 
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Defendant. 
Defe::'. •:: rv. ••• /-* C "-; - **• ~ : ViuUun io Dismiss Information for Lack of 
Jurisdiction. The State filed a memorandum in opposition and Defendant submitted reply 
memorandum,.. The motion was argued u» LJJC Court i m Api il o, 20O.c< N< i\\. beint1 fully advised, 
!Vj Court rules as follows: 
BACKGROUND 
Detendant Rick)' Augilau w as arrested on January 21, 2009 after a] legedly firing a gun into 
a crowd and killing one boy. Defendant wras 16 years old at the time of the alleged offense, He was 
charged with murder and other offenses under Utah s direct-file statute, Section CSC iC'Ul. 
Defendant moves this Court lo declare the direct file statute unconstitutional and dismiss the criminal 
Information for lack of jurisdiction. 
• >t ,< ! w . H 
Defendant argues that the direct-file statute cannot be harmonized with other statutes in 
Utah's Juvenile Court Act, Section 78A-6-101, etseq. Section 78A-6-116(3) provides that a minor 
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may be charged with a crime only under the Serious Youth Offender Act,1 the Certification Hearing 
statute,2 or a traffic violation. Because the direct-file statute expressly grants district courts exclusive 
jurisdiction over a minor charged by Information or indictment of murder, it necessarily pemiits a 
minor to be charged and convicted without the proceedings against the minor being initiated under 
the Serious Youth Offender Act or Certification Hearing statute. 
Defendant argues that based upon a plain reading of the statutes, there is a conflict between 
the requirements of Section 78A-6-116(3) and the exclusive jurisdiction granted to district courts 
under Section 78A-6-701. If Defendant's argument were correct and the legislature intended 
Section 78A-6-116(3) to require cases such as this to proceed in juvenile court, this interpretation 
of the statute would effectively render the direct-file statute inoperable. 
Because the Court "cannot presume that the legislature intended to create a conflict," Mads en 
v Brown, 701 P.2d 1086,1090 (Utah 1985), when presented with apparently inconsistent statutory 
provisions, the "statutes must be looked at together, in the light of established rules of statutory 
construction, with a view to reconciling any apparent conflict and giving each of them effect 
according to their purpose insofar as that can be accomplished." United States Smelting, Ref. & 
Mining Co. v.Nielsen. 437 P.2d 199, 201 (Utah 1968) (Crockett, C.J., concurring). See also Board 
1
 The Serious Youth Offender Act requires that a youth 16 years or older must be 
charged by criminal Information for one of several enumerated felonies, excluding murder 
or aggravated murder. If the juvenile court finds probable cause and certain mitigating 
factors are absent, it must order the youth to be bound over in district court. Section 78A-
6-702. 
2
 The Certification Hearing statute provides that the prosecutor may file a criminal 
Information and move the juvenile court to certify to the district court a youth 14 years or 
older charged with a felony. If the juvenile court finds probable cause, it must conduct a 
preliminary hearing to determine whether it would be "contrary to the best interests of the 
minor or the public for the juvenile court to retain jurisdiction." Section 78A-6-703. 
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of Education of Jordan Sch Dist. v. Sandy City Corp., 2004 UT 37, [^20, 94 P.3d 234 (courts "have 
an obligation to harmonize alleged inconsistencies within and between statutes, avoiding conflicts 
when possible."). 
The legislative history of these statutes demonstrates that excluding Section 78A-6-701 as 
an exception under Section 78A-6-116(3) was not the result of inadvertence, but a conscious choice 
on the part of the legislature and, therefore, it is reasonable to conclude that the legislature did not 
consider Section 78A-6-116(3) and Section 78A-6-701 to be in conflict. 
Unlike today, where the direct-file statute is a separate statute that grants district courts 
exclusive jurisdiction over minors charged with murder, in 1995 the language of the direct-file 
statute was included as a subsection in the statute that set forth the original jurisdiction of the 
juvenile courts. See Utah Code Ann. § 78-3a-16(l) (1995) ("The adult judicial system shall have 
exclusive original jurisdiction over all persons 16 years of age or older charged by information or 
indictment with . . . an offense which would be murder or aggravated murder if committed by an 
adult."). See also Utah Code Ann. § 78-3a-16(2)-(6) (1995) (establishing the original jurisdiction 
of the juvenile courts). At that time, Section 78-3 a-44, which was aprecursorto Section 78A-6-116, 
expressly included the direct-file language from Section 78-3a-16 in addition to the Serious Youth 
Offender Act and Certification Hearing statute. See Utah Code Ann. § 78-3a-44(4) (1995) ("A child 
may not be charged with a crime or convicted in any court except as provided in Subsection 
78-3a-16(l)[, the direct-file statute], Section 78-3a-25, [the certification statute], or 78~3a-25.1 [, the 
serious youth offender statute,] and in cases involving traffic violations."). 
In 1996, various provisions of the Juvenile Court Act were amended and re-numbered. 
Specifically, the direct-file language was removed from Section 78-3a-16(1) and enacted as a stand-
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alone statute setting forth the exclusive jurisdiction of the district courts. See Utah Code Ann. § 78-
3a-601 (1996). At the same time, Section 78-3a-44 was re-numbered as Section 78-3a-515 and, 
importantly, reference to the direct-file statute was removed. From these legislative enactments, it 
appears that the legislature believed that by creating a stand-alone statute addressing the district 
court's exclusive jurisdiction in cases involving a minor charged with murder, it was no longer 
necessary to include the direct-file language in the newly re-numbered Section 78-3a-515. Finally, 
in 2008, Section 78-3a-515 was again re-numbered as Section 78A-6-116, and the direct-file statute 
was re-numbered as Section 78A-6-701. Based upon the foregoing legislative history, it is 
reasonable to conclude that, despite their apparent inconsistency, the legislature did not consider 
Section 78A-6-116 and Section 78A-6-701 to be in conflict. 
Because the Court is required to at least attempt to reconcile apparently inconsistent statutory 
provisions, and particularly in light of the fact that the legislature likely did not consider Section 
78A-6-116(3) and Section 78A-6-701 to be in conflict, the Court must seek an interpretation that, 
if possible, renders the statutes consistent without undermining the purposes for which they were 
enacted. Perhaps the easiest way to do this is to view Section 78A-6-116 as applying only to 
proceedings originating in the juvenile court. Section 78A-6-116(3) would be read as follows: "[In 
all cases over which the juvenile court has original jurisdiction, a] minor may not be charged with 
a crime or convicted in any court except as provided in Sections 78A-6-702 and 78A-6-703, and in 
cases involving traffic violations." Utah Code Ann. § 78A-6-116(3). This interpretation does not 
substantively alter "Section 78A-6-116(3) and, because Section 78A-6-701 does not involve cases 
over which the juvenile court has original jurisdiction, it reconciles any apparent conflict with the 
direct-file statute. 
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Defendant next argues that the direct-file statute permits constitutionally excessive 
prosecutorial discretion because it fails to provide prosecutors with guidelines for determining 
whether to file a criminal Information for murder directly in district court or file apetition in juvenile 
court. In 1995, the Utah Supreme Court held that the previous version of the direct-file statute 
violated the Utah Constitution's Uniform Operations of Law clause because it permitted identical 
offenses to be brought either to the district court or juvenile court. State v. Mohi 901 P.2d 991 
(Utah 1995). The Mohi Court invalidated the portion of the direct-file statute that gave the 
prosecutor unfettered discretion as to where to file the juvenile's charge of murder. Following Mohi, 
the Utah legislature modified the direct-file statute and removed the discretionary language. 
Defendant argues that the current statute still grants excessive prosecutorial discretion. This 
Court agrees with the State's reading of the direct-file statute that a 16 or 17 year old charged with 
what would be murder if committed by an adult must be brought directly to the district court. The 
prosecution's only discretion is the legitimate choice of which charge or charges to file based upon 
a consideration of the evidence. This traditional type of discretion has been repeatedly upheld as 
constitutional. The direct-file statute simply permits the prosecutor to select "a charge to fit the 
circumstances of a defendant [This] requires a legal determination on the part of the prosecutor 
as to which elements of an offense can likely be proved at trial." Id. at 1003. According to Mohi, 
it is this "charging decision that is protected by traditional notions of prosecutor discretion." Id. 
Absent a showing of selective prosecution, which is not constitutionally protected, see United States 
v. Batchelder, 442 ITS. 1T4, 125 (U.S. 1979) ("Selectivity1n the"enforcement of criminal laws is, 
of course, subject to constitutional constraints."), the prosecutorial discretion allowed by the direct-
file statute is no different than the prosecutor's traditional exercise of discretion in any criminal case 
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and is not, therefore, constitutionally impermissible. 
Defendant also raises several challenges to the constitutionality of the direct-file statute, 
including arguments based upon due process, equal protection, unnecessary rigor, and policy 
considerations. Each of these arguments fail for the simple reason that the Utah Supreme Court has 
held that "juveniles have no constitutional right to be tried as juveniles." Mohi, 901 P.2d at 1005 
(citing State v Bell 785 P.2d 390,399 (Utah 1989)). As noted in Mohi, when persons are "properly 
charged in adult court in the first place, [they] . , . have no state due process right to a hearing to 
determine whether they can be retained as adults for trial. [T]he state is not required to give juvenile 
status to anyone." Id. Because Defendant has no constitutional '"right5 to juvenile treatment, [he] 
cannot claim that [his] juvenile status was unconstitutionally removed by the legislature." Id. Thus, 
his constitutional arguments are necessarily unavailing. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, the Court determines that Defendant has not demonstrated that Utah's 
direct-file statute, Section 78A-6-701, is in conflict with the remaining sections of the Juvenile Court 
Act, Section 78A-6-101, etseq., nor does it violate Constitutional principles. Accordingly, the Court 
denies Defendants' Motion to Dismiss Information for Lack of Jurisdiction. 
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